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ABSTRACT
I argue that the debate between deontologists and consequentialists of contract 
law conflates and therefore unduly confuses the analysis of each of them.  The debate is a 
reprise of the conflation of reason and knowledge.  Present-day legal consequentialists 
see reason (pure or practical) as unhelpful or worse.  Pragmatism, if anything, rules the 
day.  But the present-day rationalists fare no better, seeking to make constitutive claims 
of knowledge on the basis of reason.  Hence the concept of contract as promise has been 
subject to the criticism that it fails as an explanation of the law (versus an exposition of 
how our relationships ought to be ordered).
There is irony in the overwhelming interest of the consequentialist legal academy 
in trying to find a scientific answer to our most fundamental questions of duty and 
deontologists to defend morality consequentially.  I argue that there are limits to each and 
that we operate consequentially and deontologically in the ordering of our private affairs, 
often simultaneously.  The mistakes (typical of reason’s drive to a single maximand) are 
assuming, on one hand, that contractual consequentialism defines our commercial 
relationships, or, on the other, that contracts are capable of containing our moral 
obligations.  Put another way, there is nothing moral about the contract (versus the 
underlying promise), and the conflation of the two is the source of the confusion over the 
limits of the law of contract.  The moral or transcendental aspect of the contract is the 
underlying promise - its soul, so to speak - but the law can only doctor its body, what 
shows in the contract.
DUTY AND CONSEQUENCE:
A NON-CONFLATING THEORY OF PROMISE AND CONTRACT
This essay proposes another view in the ongoing attempt to reconcile autonomy 
and efficiency theories of contract.1  On one side of the debate stand the deontologists of 
contract, represented by Charles Fried, who find a philosophical justification for the law 
of contracts in the autonomous act of will that constitutes a binding promise.2  On the 
other side stand consequentialists of contract, like Richard Craswell and a host of other 
law and economics scholars.3 Indeed, there are modern consequentialist theories of non-
legal norms of agreement, such as those proposed by Eric Posner.4
Other attempts to reconcile autonomy and efficiency are insightful, but, I believe, 
in the end, unsatisfying, because they insist on finding a moral justification for contract 
law.  My thesis separates the legal relationship of contract from the promise embedded 
within it.  As much as my intuition (and years of experience in dealing with complex 
contracts) tells me there is sanctity in promise that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by 
consequentialist theories, I believe it is wrong to look for deontology inherent in the 
institution of contract law.
The problem is in conflating contract and promise.  Promises, not contracts, are
moral acts.  Viewed deontologically, they are conscious acts of autonomous agents to 
1
 See, e.g., Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract, forthcoming, __ MICH. L. REV. ___ (2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=641442; Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in 
Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420 (2001).  
2 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
3 Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 
(1989).
4 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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create interpersonal duties.  They invoke the Kantian antinomies of physical cause and 
transcendental freedom:  by our choice we change the universe.  But the philosophy 
underlying the binding nature of a promise over time is complex.  Even where, for 
example, the promise is infused with a religious duty (e.g., marriage), many religions 
acknowledge that circumstances can obviate the promise, notwithstanding that it was 
made “until death do us part.”  Or if we justify the morality of promises consequentially, 
keeping them may still not produce the greatest good.
Contracts, on the other hand, are constructs of a system of law, whereby the state 
agrees to enforce certain promises entered into in a certain form, subject to the limits of 
language in articulating the promise.  I want to argue there is nothing moral about the 
contract (versus the underlying promise), and the conflation of the two is the source of 
the confusion over the limits of the law of contract. The moral or transcendental aspect 
of the contract is the underlying promise - its soul, so to speak - but the law can only 
doctor its body, what shows in the contract.5  That to me is the limit of the law.
Academic law, particularly in its explanatory and normative role for commercial 
relationships, aspires to science and, as such, abhors deontology.   There are two primary 
reasons.  First, consequences are measurable, at least in theory.  There is no 
“methodological purchase” in deontology.6 Second, deontology is fraught with paradox.  
For every duty, there is a seemingly polar opposite consideration.  Consideration of duty 
entails bright lines and gray areas, law and equity, fixed rules and intuitive application.   
5
 Or to put it in terms of a biblical axiom (even if it is not part of my personal tradition):  “And Jesus said to 
them, ‘Whose likeness and inscription is this?’ They said, ‘Caesar's.’ Then he said to them, ‘Render 
therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.’”  MATTHEW 22:20-
21.
6 POSNER, supra note 4, at 192.
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Recognition of the paradox of deontology is as old as our thinking about right and wrong.  
The theology of the prophet Micah was based on the inability of human reason to 
reconcile justice and mercy.  But Micah’s resolution was bereft of philosophy or science, 
and left the untying of the knot to God.7  And the paradoxes of deontology (much less the 
paradox posed by our apparent inability to reconcile deontology and consequentialism) 
are particularly frustrating to anyone who wants to set forth a unified theory.8
The attempt to transform law into science, whether by the self-contained 
induction of the case method or by economic theory, butts up against the more general 
philosophical problem how we reconcile our explanatory and normative methodologies 
and judgments.  Since Bayle observed, in connection with the presence of evil in the 
world, that God could be either all-powerful (in which case He is responsible for evil) or 
all-good (in which case He cannot be responsible for evil, and hence not all powerful), 
but not both, philosophers have struggled to reconcile why the world as it is (explanatory) 
often does not match up with the world as it should be (normative).  On one extreme, you 
can deny, as did Hume, that there is any “ought” beyond the empirical world.  On the 
other, you can hold, as did Hegel, history is a progression toward the uniting of world as 
it is and as it ought to be.  Or, like Kant, you can resign yourself to the fact that we will 
never unite the two.9
7
 Micah 6:8 (JPS, 1955) (“And what the LORD doth require of thee:  Only to do justly, and to love mercy, 
and to walk humbly with thy God.)
8
 Nathan Oman comments on the pluralistic theories offered in STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY  
(2004):  “So long as philosophers of law focus on a quest for a single master value that explains all of 
contract law, their arguments are likely to run into the same problems that despite his ingenuity and 
subtlety affect Smith’s theory.”  Oman, supra note 1, at 32.
9 See, generally, SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT (2002).
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In assessing the justifications for promise and contract, we can approach the 
conflict between deontology and consequentialism in something of a microcosm, where
the duties we create and the consequences we desire are, at least by first blush, our own.  
It is one thing to contemplate duty and consequence when the question is how you would 
weigh your duty to tell the truth against the consequence of revealing to the inquiring 
Gestapo officer that a Jew is hiding in your barn.  It is another to consider whether a 
dealer in New York’s Diamond District will go back on an agreement sealed with mazel 
v’broche.10 I suspect in the former case, even the most committed consequentialist would 
pause to consider whether there is a duty beyond the measurement of utils.  And the most 
committed deontologists have struggled with Kant’s apparent pronouncement that the 
duty not to lie would trump the protection of the hidden Jew.11
To me, it is more interesting, less wrenching and perhaps more useful in daily life 
to look at the competing frustrations of consequentialism and deontology where parties 
seek to order their private economic affairs in highly uncertain environments either with 
or without contract.   Committed consequentialists are frustrated by their inability to 
model the highly contingent future.12  Committed deontologists throw up their hands 
10 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:  Extra-contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
11
 The source of this pronouncement was an essay written by Kant late in life entitled “On the Supposed 
Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives.”  For a short summary of the traditional and alternative interpretations 
of this essay, see NEIMAN, supra note 9, at 73-74.
12 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World:  What to Do 
When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WISC. L. REV.
323 (2004).  
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when the contract is no longer amenable to resolution under a theory of contract as moral 
commitment.13
My central thesis is that the general debate between deontologists and 
consequentialists of law, played out in the microcosm of promise and contract, is a 
reprise of the conflation of reason and knowledge that Kant attempted to resolve in the 
Critical Philosophy.  Like Hume, the present-day legal consequentialists see reason (pure 
or practical) “as inert, inactive, and even impotent.”14  Pragmatism, if anything, rules the 
day.  But the present-day rationalists fare no better.  Reason can make demands upon our 
experience and tell us how the world ought to be, but its claims cannot be constitutive.  
That is, reason cannot know that its order will be fulfilled by experience.15  Hence, 
Fried’s notion of contract as promise has been subject to the criticism that it fails as an 
explanation of the law (versus an exposition of how our relationships ought to be 
ordered).16
13 FRIED, supra note 2, at 89.
14 SUSAN NEIMAN, THE UNITY OF REASON (1994), at 11.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999), at 6 (“. . . if one wants to call these rudimentary 
principles [of social cooperation, such as don’t lie or kill indiscriminately] the universal moral law, that is 
fine with me.  But they are too abstract to be criterial.  Meaningful moral realism is therefore out, and a 
form (not every form) of moral relativism is in.”); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND 
SOLIDARITY (1989), at 4 (“[Kant and Hegel] persisted in seeing mind, spirit, the depths of the human self, 
as having an intrinsic nature – one which could be known by a kind of nonempirical super science called 
philosophy.  This meant that only half of truth – the bottom, scientific half – was made.  Higher truth, the 
truth about mind, the province of philosophy, was still a matter of discovery rather than creation. . . .  What 
was needed, and what the idealists were unable to envisage, was a repudiation of the very idea of anything 
– mind or matter, self or world – having an intrinsic nature to be expressed or represented.”)
          .
15 NEIMAN, supra note 14, at 11 (“The inadequacy of the rationalist conception of reason, though less 
apparent, is equally significant.  While Kant often attacks the rationalist vision for having an overweening 
view of reason’s capacity for knowledge, his deeper critique involves the charge that the rationalist’s 
conception of reason as knowledge leaves reason powerless to perform its own function.”)  
16
 Kraus, supra note 1, at 431-36; Craswell, supra note 3 , at 517-24.  
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The irony, to me, is the overwhelming interest of the consequentialist legal 
academy in trying to find a scientific answer to our most fundamental questions of duty,17
and deontologists like Fried trying to defend morality consequentially. There is an even 
greater irony when one considers that Kant’s conception of the gap between reason’s 
demands and the limits of knowledge are as equally applicable to science as to morality. 
As I have been taught my Kant (with whose very subtle deontology Kaplow and Shavell
seem to struggle), he is equally skeptical of the power of reason, whether as a matter of 
science or philosophy, to bring us to that First Principle or Unconditioned.18 Hence, it is 
all well and good to dismiss (at least intellectually) the Shema, the Shahada, the Lord’s 
Prayer or the categorical imperative, but by the very nature of our reason, one must 
ultimately also take the Pareto principle (or its most basic logical constituents) on some 
form of faith, if only that the universe is sufficiently ordered to be discoverable by the 
scientific method.  I want to argue that there are limits to each and that we operate 
consequentially and deontologically in our private affairs, often simultaneously.  The 
mistakes (typical of reason’s drive to a single maximand) are assuming, on one hand, that 
contractual consequentialism defines our commercial relationships, or, on the other, that 
contracts are capable of containing our moral obligations.19
17 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
18 NEIMAN, supra note 12, at 7.
19
 Professor Markovits has recently offered one of the more interesting and sophisticated attempts to 
articulate the morality of contract.  Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L. J. 1417 
(2004).  His thesis, if I understand it correctly, justifies the morality both of promise and contract (and 
associated remedies and expectations) by the communal rather than individual nature of the undertaking.  
Hence, he rejects the usual justification for the legal institution of contract – promises made in individual 
acts of autonomy, prevention of harm by justified reliance, or social welfare maximization – in favor of the 
interpersonal bonds created by the contract.  This calls upon Kant’s formulation that persons ought never be 
used as means, and must be treated as ends in themselves.
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I see the autonomy/efficiency as one going beyond how we justify the law of 
contract.  I am interested in the way the legal academy seeks to a scientific answer to our 
most fundamental questions, and at the same time, acknowledge the limits of the search 
for fundamental principles when it comes to the real world of dispute resolution.  If I am 
harsher on the consequentialists, it is because I believe neither science nor philosophy 
will ever lead us to that First Principle or Unconditioned; but only philosophy seems to
be willing to delve into the nature of the scientist's inquiry. 20  I think also this is a source 
 When persons make promises and contracts, they cease to be strangers and come to treat 
each other, affirmatively, as ends in themselves.  When persons break promises and 
contracts, by contrast, they render the sharing of ends impossible, at least in respect of the 
promised performance, and in this way become not merely strangers, but actively 
estranged.  The morality of promise and contract therefore engages one of the most basic 
values in our practical lives, and this value underwrites every element of promissory and 
contractual obligation.
Id., at 1514.  Clearly, the thesis is worthy of further thought.  I note, however, some preliminary reactions.  
First, as far as I can tell, the thesis does not account for the development of an institution called “the law of 
contract” as distinct from promise-keeping, even though the law of contract does not enforce all promises.  
Second, the thesis expressly disavows contracts between organizations, as opposed to natural persons.  Id. 
at 1464-74.  I want to slice this problem differently:  only natural persons, and not organizations, can 
experience the sanctity (whether individual or collaborative) of promise-making and promise-keeping.  But 
any person, natural or otherwise, may invoke the institution of contract, and that invocation is separate and 
apart from any moral aspect of promising that may be conflated with the contract itself.
20
 I approach this issue from a betwixt and between ontological perspective.  Regardless whether I share the 
religious conviction, I admire the courage of one scholar (reflecting, I suspect, a not uncommon view 
outside the academy, or perhaps in the academy but not generally expressed) positing there is a knowable 
mind of God that speaks to us even on the subject of contracts.  Val D. Ricks, Contract Law and Christian 
Conscience, 2003 BYU L. REV. 993.  Other scholars are unabashed atheists, and feel able to address the 
law only in terms of its consequence.  I am somewhere in the middle.  I agree with the consequentialists 
who would only accept (i.e., we can only assess the truth value of) a synthetic proposition that is testable as 
a matter of experience or possible experience.  But I find pure consequentialism to be deficient on the 
subject of what I ought to do (versus what I am capable of knowing).  As a result, I do more thinking than 
praying.  I am more interested in figuring out what the mind of God would want if there were a mind of 
God than accepting there is a mind of God and talking to it.
Indeed, at this point we approach the extremes of the metaphysics of practical reason, even according to 
Kant.  To borrow from Professor Markovits, my references to Kant are instrumental, and I too do not worry 
if my views depart from his.  Markovits, supra note 19, at 1424.  In contemplating how it was that pure 
reason could be accessible (and, hence, practical) in the empirical world, Kant said “to explain this is 
beyond the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost. . .  
[T]he idea of a pure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences, and to which we ourselves as 
rational beings belong (although we are likewise on the other side members of the sensible world), this 
remains always a useful and legitimate idea for purposes of rational belief, although all knowledge stops at 
its threshold. . . .” IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785), 
© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2005
Deontology 11
8
of the acknowledged gap between the academy and the practicing profession.  When the 
world is so complex the exceptions to law and economics models  subsume their
predictive capability, we have to step back and ask what we are doing.  What I often see 
in law and economics is the desire, notwithstanding disclaimers to the contrary, to find 
the last link that would unravel, a la Freud, the mystery of subjective choice (hence, 
Judge Posner's view it is an embarrassment that economics cannot model how a judge 
will decide).21  As we move from the objective to the subjective, and from the collective 
to the individual, from simple modelable decisions to those most normal humans would 
never permit to be resolved by a computer, the likelihood we will ever find a single 
predictive maximand, deontological or consequential, decreases.  This is the 
overwhelming thrust of current scholarship (and most of the history of philosophy).  In 
contrast, the real world is, at a minimum, dualistic, and always has been. 22
I am quite positive - there is no unified field theory equivalent of the objective 
and subjective, because despite the yearning for attainment of an Unconditioned First 
Principle of human behavior in science or economics, no algorithm will ever tell a judge 
how to temper justice with mercy.  That is because in the moment of decision, when it is 
in BASIC WRITINGS OF KANT, (Allen W. Wood, ed., 2001), at 219-20.  To go back to the “lying to save a 
friend” example, even if Kant meant truth-telling to trump saving a life, by his own architectonic, his 
access to the rational is no more capable of proof than mine.  And, as I will elaborate, I do not agree that 
either truth-telling or promise-keeping are the ultimate moral values.
21 Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does),” 3 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993) (“At the heart of economic analysis of law is a mystery that is also an 
embarrassment: how to explain judicial behavior in economic terms. . . .”).
22
 See Oman, supra note 1.  Like Mr. Oman, I struggle with unified and pluralistic theories, and I admire 
his passion to find an answer that is more than ad hoc.  I may not be as sanguine, however.  I believe it is 
the nature of reason to engage in an unrequited search for unified theories in an ad hoc world, or put 
another way, to unite the “is” and the “ought.”  See NEIMAN, supra note 9; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contracts 
and Contingency: A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, forthcoming, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. ___ 
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=651404.  
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time to apply a rule to a circumstance, we are free.  We can measure (in theory) how most 
of us react and decide in that moment, but the possibility that one of us dissents and says 
"aha, now I understand the principle to be something else" invokes something we will 
never be able to measure. That moment of choice, which is the same as the moment of 
freedom when I have a creative epiphany, is simply inconsistent with an objective model 
that, in its heart yearns to predict the subjective.  Or to put it another way, to be a legal 
positivist (as was, it has been argued, Kant23) does not mean the natural law or the moral 
law does not exist, or is inaccessible to reason.  It simply means that the natural law is not
accessible as a matter of knowledge.
On the other hand, the idea that a contract (as opposed to the underlying promise) 
establishes a moral obligation seems to me a gross overstatement of the case.  The law of 
contract is a human institution, designed to select those promises the state will enforce.  It 
is the promise itself that is morally transcendent (my word is no less my bond because I 
have failed to comply with the statute of frauds!).  Trying to justify the utility of a 
principle of contract law on the basis of its moral worth is as futile as the attempt to prove 
God’s existence as a matter of knowledge.24  My separation of promise and contract is 
23
 Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1996) (“The premise of 
Kant’s account is that, in the absence of legal authority, we must expect that individuals will disagree about 
right and justice and that this disagreement will lead to violent conflict.  The task of the legislator is to put 
an end to this conflict by replacing individual judgments with the authoritative determinations of positive 
law.”)
24
 To paraphrase Professor Smith’s explication of law’s quandary, why do even committed 
consequentialists talk about the law as though it were the product of some real or hypothetical author?  
Although I may be reading too much into his speculations at the conclusion of the book, it seems clear to 
me he believes secular theorists are simply unwilling to posit the possibility that the law is in fact the 
product of some Author.  Perhaps it is a fine distinction, but the positing of an Author allows reason to state 
constitutive principles of knowledge, something I believe is beyond its power.  I do believe, however, that 
reason demands an ordering of law in accordance with regulative principles, and that is the source of the 
sense of authorship.   Whether a divine Author is responsible for reason’s demand that the world be 
intelligible (i.e., the teleological proof) is a religious question on which I remain agnostic, and on which 
reasonable people can disagree.
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consistent with at least the New Institutional Economics (versus dyed in the wool rational 
actor theory) holds the law of private ordering to be a backup mechanism to other means 
and concepts by which we agree to interact, allocate resources, and resolve disputes.25  It 
does not matter (to answer Professor Smith’s question in Law’s Quandary26) that law is a 
self-contained game, an augury to the uninitiated, deciphered by its participants as though 
there were a pre-existing answer, even though all indication is that judges make it up as 
they go along.  It is tolerated because it models resolutions to disputes that are, by and 
large, preferred to the next step after law, which is violence. That is not to say that a 
dispute resolved by law has been resolved well, or morally, or even justly, but it has been 
resolved in accordance with a process that, at least on the surface, is more humane, and 
arguably less random, than trial by ordeal or lots.
Even in a much longer article, I do not believe I could state the thesis more clearly
than I already have, nor offer more compelling arguments for accepting it.  What I 
propose to do is explore briefly the ironies that are at the source of the conflation, by 
synthesizing some very old and very new views on the subject of promise and contract.27
First, the “science” of contract law – whether self-contained legal theory or based in law 
and economics – makes normative judgments that are as much based on a certain kind of 
25
 Peter G. Klein, New Institutional Economics (1998), at 6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=115811. 
26 STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004).
27
 Jody Kraus has taken a similar tack in assessing deontological or autonomy based justifications for 
contract law versus those based on efficiency.  Kraus, supra note 1.   He makes a persuasive argument that 
proponents of efficiency theory, like Richard Posner, simply assume away the question whether there is an 
implicit moral principle.  “[T]he instrumental nature of Posner’s defense of wealth maximization actually 
undermined the claim that it should be viewed as a moral principle.  An instrumental defense of wealth 
maximization presupposes the value of the ends it promotes.  Thus, on his initial view, despite his claim 
that wealth maximization constituted a moral principle itself, the normative value of wealth maximization 
is derivative of some unspecified moral theory.”  Id., at 429.  On the other hand, autonomy or deontological 
theories of contract “are notoriously difficult to actual questions of institutional design.”  Id., at 431.  
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faith (i.e., at the very extremes of the power of reason) as deontology.28  Hence, contract 
science imputes a certain morality to the legal relationship, even when it expressly 
disclaims any such intention.  Second, the philosophy of promising is far from being 
exclusively deontological.  Indeed, the source of our feeling of obligation, whether it 
springs from a priori duty or utilitarianism notions of the good, has been a matter of 
intense debate.  Hence, philosophers of promising have struggled with the same issues of 
morality and efficiency, apart from the legal consequences.
As a result, from these converging sources, it is not surprising that similar 
questions around duty and consequence have, as between the problems of promise and 
contract, been thrown together.  I will conclude by suggesting they need to be pulled 
apart.  
The Normative Underpinning of Legal and Economic Contract Theory
One of the more interesting recent theories of contract exemplifies the problem
that arises when conflating the legal rights inherent in contract with notions of right and 
wrong.  Omri Ben-Shahar has proposed the so-called “no-retraction principle”:  that 
promises become enforceable contracts without mutual assent gradually over the period 
during which the parties begin to consider a transaction, and which culminates in a 
formal agreement.29  I contend that the reactions to this proposal in fact reflect the issues 
28
 Or, as Kraus observes in the case of Richard Posner, simply asserts that the desired end is the moral 
principle.  Id., at 429.  In so doing, Posner is able to defend wealth maximization as a hybrid moral 
principle combined the virtues of both deontology and consequentialism.  Kraus wryly observes that even 
Judge Posner may not have managed to solve the concept of paradox:  “If this defense were successful, 
Posner would have provided not only a normative foundation for the economic analysis of law, but a break-
through in the foundation of morality, and perhaps logic, as well.”  Id., at 430.
29
 Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent:  Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1829 (2004)
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arising when one attempts, as does Professor Ben-Shahar (albeit cleverly), to force the 
square peg of a moral promise into the round hole of a legal contract. 30  It strikes me this 
has its source in concerns about opportunism, a concept I believe, at its source, springs 
more from notions of duty (going back on something already agreed to take advantage of 
changed circumstance is a repugnant human quality) than adverse consequence.  Put 
another way, there is more deontology in the consequential assessment of contract law 
than we have either recognized or been willing to acknowledge.  And that is one source 
of the conflation of promise and contract.
We need carefully to parse through the source of our normative judgments about 
things like opportunism.  Modern philosophical consequentialism (of which utilitarianism 
and welfare economics are subsets) is properly traced back to Hume, who clearly would 
consider opportunism to be at the core of human nature, and not in the least surprised that 
moral notions had grown up around it.  Indeed, according to Hume, the obligation of 
promising, apart from any legal consideration, is one “of those three laws [the others 
being the stability of possession, and its transference by consent], that the peace and 
security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a 
good correspondence among men, where they are neglected.”31  Hume’s view of the 
obligation of promise, much less contract, is wholly non-deontological.  The obligation of 
promise is not natural (i.e., to will an obligation to another contravenes one’s natural self-
30
 See Daniel Markovits, The No-Retraction Principle and the Morality of Negotiations, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1903 (2004); Jason Scott Johnston, Investment, Information, Promissory Estoppel, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1923 
(2004); Ronald J. Mann, Contracts – Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2004).  In fairness, 
Professor Ben-Shahar acknowledged much was unresolved by his proposal, and it appropriately stirred the 
theoretical pot.  Omri Ben-Shahar, Mutual Assent Versus Gradual Ascent:  The Debate Over the Right to 
Retract, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1947 (2004).
31 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (Ernest C. Mossner, ed., 1985) (1739-40), at 578.  
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interest).  But over time, it becomes apparent that mere stability of possession and its 
transference by consent is not enough to ensure harmony.  Hence, “promises have no 
natural obligation, and are mere artificial contrivances for the convenience and advantage 
of society.”32  Hume demonstrates this by the example of a promise extracted by force or 
duress:
A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent sum to a 
surgeon to cure him, wou’d certainly be bound to performance; tho’ the 
case be not so much different from that of one, who promises a sum to a 
robber, as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments of morality, if 
these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and 
convenience.33
The acknowledged mutual benefit of the honoring of promises – a sort of ritual 
incantation of a particular set of words, or signs or symbols –  produces a “sentiment of 
morals [that] concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind.”34
Note, moreover, that this is apart from any legal consequence:  “After these signs are 
instituted, whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to execute his 
engagements, and must never expect to be trusted any more, if he refuse to perform what 
he promis’d.”35  Hence, opportunism is an issue that arises in connection with the moral 
issue of promise, before it ever becomes conflated with the legal act of contract.
It is therefore hardly a new insight that non-contractual (as well as contractual) 
obligations can be explained empirically and consequentially, and without resort to 
deontology.  Eric Posner’s thesis of social norms, that reputation is a commodity to 
32 Id., at 577.  
33 Id.
34 Id., at 574-75.  
35 Id.  
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maximized in one’s rational self-interest, is Hume’s thesis merely restated in the modern 
lingo of law and economics.  What Posner’s work takes as a given (which Hume, to his 
credit, does not) is the source of his normative judgment about utility.36
My point is that the purest form of consequentialism would hold contractual 
formalism to be entirely appropriate.  Moral sentiments, like an aversion to opportunism, 
are the product of the transformation of our passions and desires in the pursuit of a 
congenial society.  Indeed, the words that create the sentiment of obligation are arbitrary.  
(Hume’s proof of this point is we use words to create a personal resolution, and though 
we feign something like a promise, nobody understands the resolution to be obligatory.37)  
What then is wrong with leaving the pre-negotiation phase as non-binding and subject 
only to moral or social sanction, until some ritual act, like signing, dripping wax, or 
stitching with special string, changes its legal character?
What is more likely, as Jody Kraus has argued persuasively, is that efficiency is 
superior to deontology as a practical, applied theory, but deontology has superior 
normative credentials.  Kraus takes from Thomas Scanlon a methodology for reconciling 
otherwise competing theories of contract
by assigning one the role of providing a lexically prior moral justification 
of contract law (e.g., setting out the grounds for its moral permissibility), 
and the other the role of providing a lexically subordinate justification of 
the choice to have a law of contracts, as well as the choice of specific 
36
  For example, Posner says “[t]he traditional paradigm of contractual behavior generally assumes that 
people make contracts because only legal sanctions will deter a party from cheating on the contract when it 
is profitable to so.”  POSNER, supra note 4, at 151.  This is the core of the anti-opportunism justification.  
But whence comes the judgment that cheating is bad?  Is it deontological?  Is it Humean – a statement in 
moral terms of the dictates of our passions and sentiments?  Is it utilitarian?  As discussed supra note 27 
and accompanying text, it is clear that Posner fils has, like Posner pere, simply assumed a moral theory of 
welfare maximization.
37 Id.
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contract rules.  For example, one might justify the law of contracts on the 
ground that it is permitted by an autonomy-based moral theory, and yet 
hold that this justification leaves the selection among the many possible 
variants of contract law it would permit to be justified on the basis of other 
reasons.38
He proposes a unified “vertical” integration of the theories by treating autonomy theories 
“as lexical prior, or normative foundational, to efficiency theories.”39
Where I depart from Kraus is in the assumption that the positive law of contracts 
needs to be morally justified.  This is not to say that we should fail to honor our promises 
as a matter of morality.  But there is no reason, as far as I can tell, apart from the desire of 
legal scholars to find one, to import morality (either deontological or consequentially 
derived) into the contractual relationship.  The morality of promise and the utility of 
contract are wholly capable of standing on their own.40
The Philosophical Problem of the Obligations of Promise
I want to touch briefly on the philosophy of promising, and in particular, the 
sources and limits of the sanctity of promise apart from legal compulsion.  I contend 
promising sits somewhere within the spectrum of complementary and competing values, 
and our highest ethical obligations may or may not be keeping our promises (or holding 
others to theirs), even in commercial situations. To put it another way, whether or not I 
38
 Kraus, supra note 1, at 423.
39 Id., at 436.  
40
 I have focused almost entirely on the aspect of promise that is embedded in the contract.  I have not fully 
thought through moral issues around the institution of contract, such as unconscionability.  For example, do 
we justify the doctrine of unconscionability on the theory that the underlying contract does not represent a 
promise at all?  One could approach the issue of unconscionability either deontologically – to impose 
unconscionable terms is wrong apart from any outcome – or consequentially – we are better off (choose 
your methodology) if victims of unfair treatment are given the opportunity to argue they have been the 
victims of an unconscionable deal.  That, to me, is not an issue of the conflation of promise and contract, 
but a political decision – informed by any manner of moral or economic basis – to shape the institution of 
the law of contracts in a particular way.
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have a moral obligation to fulfill a promise is complex enough without superimposing the 
issue of legal enforcement.
Robert J. Fogelin’s 1983 essay on the philosophy of promising is instructive.41
Philosophers seem to agree (beginning with Hume) that obligations cannot be brought 
into being merely by the action of agent (i.e., willing that there be an obligation).  “To 
become obligated, we must do something else in virtue of which we are obligated.”42
Fogelin offers a limited defense of Richard Price’s derivation of the obligation of 
promising.43  Price agreed that an obligation could be brought into being merely by an act 
of will.  He contended, however, that there was an easy solution:  fidelity to promises was 
a branch or instance of veracity.44  Keeping a promise is simply a special case of telling 
the truth.45 Fogelin observes:
At first sight, this theory may seem merely silly.  Although it does not 
equate certain future tense statements with promises, it does have the 
consequence that a person who utters a future tense statement about his 
own actions falls under an obligation to make it come true.  Suppose, 
however, that Allen says to Brandon, “Since today is a holy day, I shall 
stay my hand, but tomorrow I shall return and thrash you.”  Having said 
this, is Allen now under an obligation to return the next day and thrash 
Brandon?  The answer seems to be no, but it is not immediately clear why.  
The most obvious (and plausible) explanation is that we read Allen’s 
remark as the expression of a resolution or of an intention.  In that case, no 
obligation rests on Allen to thrash Brandon.46
41
 Robert J. Fogelin, Richard Price on Promising:  A Limited Defense, 21 J. HIST. PHIL. 289 (1983).
42 Id., at 290.
43
 Price was an eighteenth century English philosopher, and a contemporary of Thomas Bayes, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Adam Smith and others.  His treatment of promising appeared in the influential REVIEW OF 
THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS, published in 1787.  Spartacus Educational, available at 
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/PRprice.htm.
44
 Fogelin, supra note 41, at 291.
45 Id., at 292.
46 Id.
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If this is not a promise, but we are nevertheless obliged not to lie, must Allen still thrash 
Brandon?  The answer is no.  “If a person asserts that he will do something – where he is 
not merely expressing a resolve – then he eo ipso falls under an obligation to do so, 
granting, of course, that this obligation may be overridden by others.”47  In short, we are 
morally obliged to keep promises, as we are morally obliged to tell the truth, unless there 
is a very good reason not to.
Fogelin also assesses a more difficult criticism of Price’s veracity theory, which is 
that because in making a promise we are not saying anything that can correctly be 
considered true or false.48  Fogelin defends the veracity theory by arguing promises are 
forms of “explicit performatives.”  “Leave the room” is a primary utterance, but in 
context it could be a command, a request, or a piece of advice.  Explicit performatives are 
the markers showing how the utterance is to be taken in context.  “I command you to 
leave the room” contains the explicit performative “I command” which modifies the 
primary utterance “leave the room.”  While Price’s critics would argue that a 
performative like “I promise to be there tomorrow” cannot assert a truth claim, Price’s 
defenders “would say that in using the explicit performatives “I promise etc,” which does 
not have the form of a truth claim, I eo ipso put forward the truth claim that underlies it as 
a primary utterance, i.e., the assertion “I shall be there.”49
The final defense of Price’s veracity theory refutes the notion that a promise 
cannot be linked to truth-telling because it is merely a prediction of one’s future behavior.  
47 Id., at 293.
48 Id.
49 Id., at 294.
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Fogelin responds that once I make a promising statement, “I am then expected to 
conform my conduct to what I have said.  It is an assertion of this kind, where my future 
conduct is expected to instance my remark, that provides the best model for the assertions 
inherent in a promise.”50
Finally, Fogelin reconciles the truth-telling obligation of promise with the 
separate obligation of contract:
Consider the exchange of a promise for a present benefit or an exchange 
of mutual promises, the standard contractual situations.  On the 
contractarian account, it is the agreement that creates the mutual 
obligations.  On Price’s account, it is the fact that agreement has been 
reached (typically through bargaining) that leads each party to say that he 
will do a certain thing.  Here the agreement is not the source of the 
obligation, but the reason why each person is willing to accept an 
obligation through saying he will do a certain thing.  Rather than taking 
contractual agreement as a primitive source of obligation, as so many 
have, Price tries to derive it from a deeper source:  our obligation to do 
what we say.51
Having defended philosophically grounded the obligation of promise in the 
obligation to tell the truth,52 Fogelin is less willing to accept Price’s defense of our 
obligation to tell the truth.  Price’s belief “there is an ‘immediate rectitude in veracity’”53
is an a priori proposition.  It is subject to attack by either act or rule utilitarians, on one 
hand, or by deontologists who might argue there are duties that supersede truth-telling.
50 Id., at 296.
51 Id., at 297. Cf. Frank Menentrez, Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 859 (2000) (arguing the contract embodies a promise, and because the promise 
is a moral act, the law should discourage efficient breach).
52 As does Professor Markovits, albeit relying on Kant’s “lying promise” example.  Markovits, supra note  
19, at 1422-35.
53
 Fogelin, supra note 41, at 301.
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So if a promise is grounded in truth-telling, but truth-telling may not necessarily 
be the highest value (whether deontologically or consequentially derived) in all 
circumstances, we may find ourselves in circumstances in which holding ourselves or 
others to a promise is also not the highest good. 54
Here is a not-uncommon example.  In the course of negotiating a deal under tight 
time frames, I promised the general counsel of the other party that my outside counsel 
would have a draft agreement in the hands of his outside counsel by ten o’clock the next 
morning.  When I so informed my outside counsel, I learned in response that, while it 
was certainly possible for them to make good on the promise, the contract draft would not 
only contain a significant number of placeholders, but would also stand the chance of 
taking an incorrect and disadvantageous position on a critical issue.  I felt the tug of my 
moral commitment, but recognized I had a competing obligation to my client to override 
the promise.
I contend circumstances of this kind arise over and over in the commercial world, 
and in far less de minimis circumstances.  We do not serve the business community well 
by conflating this moral obligation, which may be overridden by others, with the 
potential that it may also be legally enforceable.
Conclusion:  A Pluralistic Thesis
I conclude by restating my pluralistic thesis of contract as contract (i.e., an 
economic and social institution) and promise as promise (an ethical duty), and where and 
54
 For example, to return to the “lying to save a friend” example, truth may not be the ultimate value.  Truth 
matters, but peace or harmony or pragmatics may matter more.  This is consistent with Jewish ethical 
tradition.  See Jonathan Sacks, Covenant and Conversation, http://www.chiefrabbi.org/
thoughts/vayechi5765.pdf (Dec. 25, 2004).  As to whether holding oneself or others to promises or 
contracts (legally or morally) is the ultimate value, see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of 
Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, forthcoming, 78 TEMP. L. REV. ___,  ___ (2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=657421. 
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how legal remedies of breach and the institutional power of the state as an enforcement 
mechanism are appropriate. I propose to have my cake and eat it, in the end relying on
intuition derived from years of real world experience:  law is a construct, and one to be 
forced and manipulated, through a bit of prescient language and foresight, a good deal of 
ex post reconstruction, and a fair amount of arcane logic,55 according to one’s interest and 
to the anticipated consequences of the positions taken.  But, at the same time, we operate 
in a moral sphere, quite apart from the law, except when the two are conflated by those 
who do not recognize or acknowledge their independent sources.
A respectable place to anchor my dualism is with Amartya Sen, who as much as
anyone has tried to reconcile ethics and economics.  He distinguishes welfarism 
(“requiring that the goodness of a state of affairs be a function only of the utility 
information regarding that state”) from consequentialism (“requiring that every choice, 
whether of actions, institutions, motivations, rules, etc., be ultimately determined by the 
goodness of the consequent states of affairs”.56  Sen argues for an ethical/economic 
dualism:
55 See, e.g., Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90 (July 11, 2002) (the 
certificate of incorporation precludes the authorization of a senior preferred stock without a vote by class of 
the junior preferred, but where the issuance is accomplished by merger rather than an amendment of the 
certificate, Delaware case law denies the junior shareholders the right to a class vote, because the certificate 
does not expressly provide for a class vote on a merger, even though the merger has exactly the same effect 
as an amendment to the certificate); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042; 1997 
Del. Ch. LEXIS (Apr. 25, 1997) (junior preferred shareholders assert breach of duty claims against the 
directors based not on their status qua preferred shareholders, because the contract does not grant them 
rights, but qua common shareholders under a Revlon change in control theory; the court observed:  “While 
from a realistic or finance perspective, the heart of the matter is the conflict between the interests of the 
institutional investors that own the preferred stock and the economic interests of the common stock, from a 
legal perspective, the case has been presented as one on behalf of the common stock, or more correctly on 
behalf of all holders of equity securities.” ).
56 AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987), at 39.
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It is, of course, true that consequential reasoning appeals to the 
economists’ standard way of looking at prescriptive evaluation, and this 
can be, and has indeed often been, used rather mechanically.  However, if 
consequential reasoning is used without the additional limitations imposed 
by the quite different requirements of welfarism, position independence, 
and the overlooking of possible intrinsic value of instrumentally important 
variables, then the consequential approach can provide a sensitive as well 
as robust structure for prescriptive thinking on such matters as rights and 
freedom.  I have also argued that there are distinct advantages in following 
this route.  It contrasts both with the narrow consequential welfarism used 
in standard welfare economics, and also with some deontological 
approaches used in moral philosophy, involving inadequate consequential 
accounting.57
What is particularly appealing about this approach is its acknowledgment of the 
importance of consequence in the real world.  We all have experienced instances in 
which following a principle of moral goodness to its logical end leads to an intuitively 
adverse consequence.58 At the same time, Sen acknowledges our intuition that utility 
maximization is not the sole definition of goodness.  I contend this dualism exists in the
concrete circumstance of promises that may or may not be congruent with contractual 
obligations.59
Promises are moral issues:  the morality may be explained deontologically or in a 
Humean fashion, but they are nevertheless moral issues.  Roy Kreitner has, I think, 
pointed this in the right direction in his recent article on contract formalism.  He argues 
against the fear that the law might impose contractual liability without consent, by 
suggesting an institutional approach:
57 Id., at 78.
58 See Sacks, supra note 54 (the Talmud says it is not morally wrong to tell a bride the white lie that she is 
beautiful even when she is not).   
59 There is marketing data, for example, suggesting that customer loyalty is greater when a vendor makes 
an error and cures it well than when there has been no problem at all.  I want to juxtapose that with notions
of justice and redemption – our intuitive sense of the correctness of second chances.
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Contract law is an infrastructure:  its most important societal role is to 
supply frameworks for cooperative activity.  Like the proper functioning 
of say, a highway, contract depends not only on written rules of the road, 
but also on the reliability of contextual practices.  Courts cannot ignore 
these practices any more than they can decide disputes without recourse to 
language.  The heart of such a regime is the objective theory of contracts, 
applicable to precontractual representations and contractual 
interpretation.60
Indeed, the institution of contract is far too rigid and incomplete to deal with all of the 
contingencies of business life.  Our willingness to bend, forgive, renegotiate and take less 
than to which we might be entitled under the contract is a function not of law, but of the 
moral question whether holding oneself or others to a promise is the necessarily the 
highest of values.61
In the end, if my approach is subject to any criticism, it is that it is permanently
and metaphysically indeterminate.62 In Jody Kraus’ terms, it recognizes an institutional 
consequentialism (i.e., our institutions are based on whatever good we decide should 
shape them) as both the normative foundational and the operationally derivative bases of 
contract law.  What may be (and I believe is) deontological is the promise embedded 
within the contract.  As a good Kantian, this permanent gap does not bother me, but I 
acknowledge the frustration of those who hope for and strive to find a unified theory.
This is also an answer to Professor Smith’s quandary:  why institutional models, like law 
or economics, presuppose a discoverable order or intelligibility to human interaction.  
60
 Roy Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 429, 430.
61
 Lipshaw, Contingency, supra note 22, at     .
62
 “Metaphysical indeterminacy holds that a theory’s answer to the question is in fact indeterminate. . . .  
But while epistemic indeterminacy [i.e., although there may be a precise answer, we currently lack the 
ability to determine it] is only potentially disabling (there is some hope of overcoming it), metaphysical 
indeterminacy, like incompleteness, is permanently disabling for a theory that takes an independently 
specified domain (e.g., an area of law) as its object of inquiry.”  Kraus, supra note 1, at 432.
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The answer lies deep with human reason itself – we are hardwired to seek intelligibility 
whether or not we will ever find the scientific or theological answer.  Hence, it is in our 
very nature to conflate duty and consequence.
